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The Epistemology of Mathematical and Statistical Modeling: A Quiet Methodological Revolution A relatively silent methodological revolution has occurred over the past several decades, almost without discussion. Instead, null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) has received virtually all of the attention. Statistical and mathematical modeling-which subsume NHSThave developed into a powerful epistemological system, within which NHST plays an important though not expansive role. To most practicing researchers in psychology as well as in most statistics and methodology textbooks, NHST is the primary epistemological system used to organize quantitative methods. Instead, researchers and textbook authors should be discussing how to create and compare behavioral models that are represented mathematically and evaluated statistically.
Models are all around us, and the term model has many meanings. For example, I built model airplanes as a child. We see male and female fashion models in magazines. Psychologists study role models. These disparate concepts share in common that they are all simplifications of a complex reality. The airplane model does not fly, although its physical appearance matches one that does. The runway model epitomizes beauty and fashion. Role models engage in idealized (though perhaps unrealistic) behavior. In the same sense, our language is also a model. Speaking or writing creates a verbal instantiation of a complex reality. Our language can be nuanced and evocative, as when Elizabeth Barrett Browning wrote about love. Yet language has inherent limitations that necessarily simplify the complexity that it describes. For example, the word love must not have much precision, if I can simultaneously love barbecue, John Steinbeck, and my wife (although precision is added by context, of course). Clearly, language structures have both QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 4 flexibility and limitations as models of the complicated reality they describe, and so do mathematical models, the topic of this article.
What are mathematical models? To Neimark and Estes (1967, p. v) , "a mathematical model is a set of assumptions together with implications drawn from them by mathematical reasoning." Why not just use verbal or conceptual models? Bjork (1973) listed the advantages of mathematical models compared with verbal models: The mathematical models are more readily falsifiable, they force theoretical precision, their assumptions can be more easily studied, they promote data analysis, and they have more practical applications. In psychology and other behavioral sciences, methodologists and applied researchers describe the world in part through mathematical models. This article treats modeling, and also NHST, which modeling has quietly subsumed.
I have several related goals. First, I describe the history of NHST and reinterpret recent NHST controversy. The modeling revolution that was already in process, naturally and quietly, obviated the need for much of the controversy. Second, I describe conceptually what a mathematical model is, and I use several illustrations to show how one can be constructed. Third, I distinguish between using existing statistical modeling procedures and building mathematical models to evaluate statistically. Fourth, I discuss several implications of the modeling revolution for methodological pedagogy in psychology. In conclusion, I discuss ultimate implications of this "quiet revolution." Fisher (1921) "analyzed the variance" underlying individual differences in crop yields in relation to different fertilization regimes, and the ANOVA was born. Though Fisher's development of ANOVA is credited with starting NHST, Fisher also helped define the modeling revolution. However, both methodologists and applied researchers were so enamored with ANOVA and the associated NHST paradigm that Fisher's modeling contributions were relatively neglected for several decades.
Ultimately, the development of NHST was shared between Fisher on the one hand and Jerzy Neyman and E. S. Pearson on the other, with famous contention. Their arguments reflected different epistemological goals. Fisher developed his approach to NHST to answer scientific questions and to evaluate theory. Neyman and Pearson had more pragmatic and applied goals, to draw conclusions in difficult decision-making settings (e.g., in quality-control problems). Fisher viewed the hypothesis testing process as incremental, driven by replication, improving with each NHST decision, and potentially self-correcting. The Neyman-Pearson perspective, however, emphasized the importance of each individual decision.
The current version of NHST practiced in the applied research arena and presented in statistics courses is neither purely Fisherian nor purely Neyman-Pearsonian. For example, Fisher never referred to an alternative hypothesis or to the alpha level. As Christensen (2005) noted, Fisher used "the distribution of the (null) model and we examine whether the data look weird or not" (p. 121). However, "NP [Neyman-Pearson] testing is designed to optimally detect some alternative hypothesis" (Christensen, 2005, p. 123) but is not related to "proof-by-contradiction." Christensen (2005, p. 123) concluded, "NP testing and Fisherian testing are not comparable procedures" (see also Hubbard & Bayarri, 2003; Huberty, 1987; Maxwell & Delaney, 2004) .
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Over time, the field of statistics merged the two different NHST methods into one.
Modern statistics textbooks define NHST as a combination of the two approaches, emphasizing the main points of each-the null hypothesis and p value coming from the Fisherian tradition, and the alternative hypothesis, alpha level, and power emerging from the Neyman-Pearson tradition. Over a decade ago, Gigerenzer (1993, p. 314) called current practice "an incoherent mishmash of some of Fisher's ideas on the one hand, and some of the ideas of Neyman and E. S.
Pearson on the other hand" 1 (also see J. F. Box, 1978; Cowles, 1989; Stigler, 1986) .
In modern rendering of the NHST paradigm, the philosophical-epistemological basis begins by assuming the null hypothesis that a chance process generated the data. If the data patterns are inconsistent enough with the distributional predictions of the null, it is rejected in favor of a specified alternative. The alternative, the researcher's hypothesis, is always compared with what would be observed by chance under the null. Such focus on the null hypothesis originally engendered disagreement between Fisher and Neyman-Pearson and is the NHST feature that has been most frequently criticized in the years since.
Criticism and Adjustment of NHST
General criticism of NHST began in earnest in the 1950s. Early critics included Jones (1952), Rozeboom (1960) , Bakan (1966), and Lykken (1968; see also Jones & Tukey, 2000, and Rozeboom, 1997, for interesting historical comparisons) . Over the next 25 years, many scholars commented on and criticized NHST (see reviews in Nickerson, 2000, and various chapters in Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997) . The anti-NHST movement was especially stimulated by Cohen's (1994) cogent and engaging criticisms, and it reached a crisis in the mid-1990s.
What were the basic criticisms? Broadly stated, critics of NHST have viewed the conclusions generated by the NHST paradigm as both intellectually trivial and scientifically sterile, an QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 7 opinion captured in Cohen's (1994) title: "The Earth is Round (p < .05)." Other specific realizations of this concern include the following:
1. All (point) null hypotheses can be rejected if the sample size is large enough.
2. Rejecting the null does not provide logical or strong support for the alternative.
3. Failing to reject the null does not provide logical or strong support for the null.
4. NHST is backward because it evaluates the probability of the data given the hypothesis, rather than the probability of the hypothesis given the data.
5. Statistical significance does not imply practical significance.
Dozens of articles evaluating and criticizing NHST have discussed these and similar issues (for relatively recent treatment and review, see MacCallum, 2003, and Nickerson, 2000) .
In response to these criticisms were a number of innovative and creative approaches that were designed to fix one or more of the weaknesses of NHST. Past fixes have included the goodenough principle (Serlin & Lapsley, 1985) , Harris's (1997) expansion of Kaiser's (1960) approach using three alternatives as outcomes (reject the null, fail to reject the null, or decide that there is not enough information), and Tryon's (2001) proposal of an inferential approach based on confidence intervals. Steiger (2004) described three adjustments to NHST in ANOVA settings, including tests of contrasts, confidence intervals of standardized effect size, and testing null hypotheses other than those of zero effect. But Cohen (1994 Cohen ( , p. 1001 ) dismissed all such efforts: "Don't look for a magic alternative to NHST, some other objective mechanical ritual to replace it. It doesn't exist."
Putting NHST on Trial
In the field of quantitative methodology, the 20th century ended with a bang, not a whimper. The criticism of NHST had built gradually and then exploded in its intensity during the QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 8 middle of the 1990s. Extreme frustration with the weaknesses of NHST could be detected in the writing during this period, much of which was stark: NHST "never makes a positive contribution" (Schmidt & Hunter, 1997, p. 37) ; NHST "has not only failed to support and advance psychology as a science but also has seriously impeded it" (Cohen, 1994, p. 997) ;
NHST is "surely the most bone-headedly misguided procedure ever institutionalized in the rote training of science students" (Rozeboom, 1997, p. 335) .
Many students in introductory statistics courses have been taught the NHST jurisprudence model as a pedagogical tool. An analogy is developed between the courtroom and a research project, in which the null hypothesis is put on trial. Just as the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, the null is assumed correct (innocent) until it is rejected (proven guilty) in favor of some more plausible alternative. The burden of proof rests on the researcher,
as prosecutor, to demonstrate the "guilt" of the null, against a skeptical scientific community, the jury. The researcher is also a detective. As Tukey (1977, p. 3) noted, "Exploratory data analysis is detective in character. Confirmatory data analysis is judicial or quasi-judicial in character."
The field of quantitative methodology put this very set of trial-like procedures themselves on trial in the late 1990s, following Schmidt's (1996, p. 116) 
The Quiet Methodological Revolution
A basic thesis of this article is that the heated (and interesting) NHST controversy during the 1990s was at least partially unnecessary. In certain important ways, a different methodological revolution precluded the need to discuss whether NHST should be abandoned or continued. This quiet revolution, a modeling revolution, is now virtually complete within methodology. But within the perspective of the diffusion of innovations, this revolutionary thinking is only beginning to spread to the applied research arena and graduate training in quantitative methods. Identifying the revolution is one mechanism that will promote its diffusion.
The methodological revolution to which I refer has involved the transition from the NHST paradigms developed by Fisher and Neyman-Pearson to a paradigm based on building, comparing, and evaluating statistical/mathematical models. To illustrate, I describe how two basic summary statistics are viewed within each perspective.
The mean and variance have done yeoman service to psychology and other behavioral sciences for many years, yet their weaknesses are well-known (including, especially, their extreme sensitivity to outliers). Tukey (1977) developed a widely celebrated paradigm shift called exploratory data analysis (EDA), which is defined, at least in part, as a correction in statistical practice to overreliance on the mean and variance. (Note that EDA is not the revolution to which I refer, although it does overlap.) For the purposes of the current article, it is important to recognize how the mean and variance have shifted in concept during the modeling revolution.
Within the NHST tradition they were often referred to as "descriptive statistics" (or even "mere descriptive statistics"; Tukey, 1977, p. vii) . Postrevolution, the mean and the variance are simple mathematical models of an observed distribution of data. 2 The EDA perspective suggests that they are not "the" models, but rather that each is one of many models of the center and spread of a distribution of data. It is important to note that the computation of the mean and variance (or median and mean absolute deviation) is identical under each perspective. It is the conceptualization that has shifted, and this shift has important implications.
The null hypothesis is the leverage point to distinguish NHST from modeling. The philosophical basis of NHST begins with the null hypothesis. The researcher's hypothesis (embedded somewhere within the alternative) is compared with a chance process (the null).
Emerging from the modeling revolution, the basic NHST question is asked in a slightly different way, and a completely different answer is provided. In fact, the answer emerges from the In the modeling perspective, the researcher's hypothesis is disconfirmed, rather than the whole focus being on the null hypothesis that characterizes NHST. In modeling, the null hypothesis invoking pure chance as an explanatory process is deemphasized, although the null model from Similarly, Abelson (1997, p. 133 ) also referenced the epistemological shift that occurred as a result of the modeling revolution, though notably his discussion of what he refers to as "'goodness-of-fit' testing" is buried in an article otherwise devoted to contention over NHST:
"Most tests of null hypotheses are rather feckless and potentially misleading. However, an additional brand of sensible significance tests arises in assessing the goodness-of-fit of substantive models to data."
To fully appreciate the import of this shift, we must recognize that the epistemological focal point has completely shifted. Within the epistemological tradition emerging from NHST, the focus is the null hypothesis, H0, which we assume until it can be rejected in favor of a reasonable (but broad and relatively unspecified) alternative. The null hypothesis provides the leverage against which we understand the world. But even then, when we reject H0 as implausible, we have not addressed the question, What is the new H0 for future research?
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The postrevolution focal point is no longer the null hypothesis; it is the current model. This is exactly where the researcher-the scientist-should be focusing his or her concern.
Statisticians discuss the merits of classical versus Bayesian inference, of exploratory versus QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 12 confirmatory approaches, or of meta-analytic approaches (see, e.g., Berger, 2003; Howard, Maxwell, & Fleming, 2000) . But researchers, who are scientists, should be focusing on building a model, embedded within well-developed theory: "The major task in any science is the development of theory" (Schmidt, 1992 (Schmidt, , p. 1177 . The null hypothesis has always been a creation of the statistician. But for the scientist-researcher, his or her own research hypothesis is the natural focus. This simple and straightforward observation leads to a radical shift in both philosophy and practice: Rather than testing null hypotheses that our data arise from a chance process, we should be developing mathematical models and evaluating them statistically.
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If we are working in confirmatory mode (contrast with exploratory mode; Tukey, 1977 ), evaluating a model or theory, we specify a model (or class of models) and define appropriate competitors. For illustration, assume two nested models that are being compared, using empirical data. 5 The best model is the one that fits the data best in relation to its complexity, and it wins the contest. If it is not our original model, we admit it and attempt to interpret. The postrevolution question is, "Does the fit of the more complex model increase enough compared with that of the less complex model that the cost of additional complexity is worth it?" Or, "Is the increase in fit in moving from the simpler to the more complex model more than would be expected by chance?" Of course, the art and science of this enterprise involve how we operationalize the concepts "enough" and "better," how we measure "increase in fit," how we define "chance," and how we measure "complexity." In a sense, the null and alternative hypotheses still exist, but the null now has flexibility. However, we should stop calling the simpler model the null (which has substantial historical baggage, typically referring to the absence of any but chance processes) and refer to it as the reduced or simpler model. of variance into the levels within which they occur and defining models of the correlated error structure caused by nested levels (see Curran, 2003 , who treated the relationship between multilevel models and structural equation models).
So what is a model? How do we build and evaluate a mathematical model? The next section is directed to answering those questions.
Models as Simplified Reality, Reality Simplified as Models
The title of this section has at its heart the word reality, with two different subtitles emanating from that focal point. A prerequisite to understanding the modeling revolution is an It has been popular to suggest that all models are wrong. G. E. P. Box (1979) said, "Models of course are never true, but fortunately it is only necessary that they be useful" (p. 2).
The definitions above solve this concern from a slightly different perspective: The ultimate QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 15 correctness of models is not typically at issue, because they "of course are never true." Rather, a particular model is supposed to be simple and to match only certain specified parts of the complex reality. Further, as Box's comment makes explicit, models must be useful, and their utility is defined (at least partially) in relation to whether they accurately match the part of the reality they attempt to describe.
As illustration, I return to the arithmetic mean, viewed by postrevolution thinkers as a simple mathematical model of a distribution of data. To begin, consider the arithmetic mean in relation to the two features in the definition of a model. The mean obviously simplifies the data, because it substitutes a single summary measure for N data points. It also fits the data in certain senses because it is the center of mass of the data, and it also has optimality properties in relation to the data that it summarizes. Suppose that our goal is to build a model that explains the development of cigarette smoking among adolescents. On the basis of a nonrandom sample of 306 college students collected in 2003, Rodgers and Johnson (2007) reported the mean number of cigarettes smoked during 1 day by the 109 who called themselves "current smokers" as 3.3.
The standard deviation of this distribution was 6.2. These summary statistics are not competing models, either conceptually or statistically because they summarize different and complementary features of a distribution. Some models are not designed to compete with one another. But in other settings, the competition between simple summary statistics as basic models is both interesting and critical. For example, given the potentially skewed nature of the cigarette distribution, should one use a mean or a median to characterize the center of this distribution?
The median is 0.2 cigarettes per day, much lower than the mean because a number of these "current smokers" were not currently smoking; for 41 of them, their average cigarette QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 16 consumption per day was zero. Thus, the median in a sense competes with the mean as a mathematical model explaining cigarette use, on both conceptual and empirical grounds.
But in more sophisticated research settings, especially when the equation defining a smaller model is embedded (nested) within that specifying a larger model, then the natural goal for a researcher is to ask whether the added complexity is justified by how well the larger model fits empirical data. Then the two models compete with one another on fit and parsimony. We can build more complex and interesting models of cigarette smoking. For example, consider the simple conceptual model: "Smokers in a given year include both past smokers and new smokers, and the rate of transition into the smoking category is an important component of the process."
Mathematically, we can operationalize that model using the following equation:
P(smoker) and P(nonsmoker) measure the proportion of adolescents who are smokers and nonsmokers, respectively, and T is a parameter of the model called the transition rate, estimating the likelihood that a nonsmoker will become a smoker between time t  1 and time t. At this point there are no statistical issues involved. Rather, issues of logical coherence, mathematical tractability, and face validity have helped us frame a mathematical model. A critic might note that there is no obvious role for social influence within the model, or advertising influence, or nicotine addiction. The model simply says that some fraction of nonsmokers become smokers during an interval, and T estimates the transition rate.
The next logical step would be to posit a more complex model that has a closer match to reality and to statistically evaluate whether the increased complexity is worth the loss of QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 17 simplicity. Suppose we believe adolescents who have best friends who smoke to be differentially likely to become smokers compared with those whose best friends do not smoke:
P(smoker)t = P(smoker)t  1 + T1 * P(nonsmoker with smoking best friend)t  1 + T2  P(nonsmoker with nonsmoking best friend)t  1.
Equation 2 is our "current model." Its competitor is the simpler Equation 1. Conceptually, we ask whether distinguishing adolescents with smoking versus nonsmoking best friends is an important feature of the reality we are modeling. Statistically, we ask whether the additional match to reality of Equation 2 is worth the cost of losing simplicity compared with Equation 1. Obviously we will need a measure of a model's "match to reality" (usually called a fit statistic) and a measure of a model's "simplicity" (usually defined using degrees of freedom).
This example can be contrasted to a similar evaluation within the NHST perspective. For example, we could use a two-group t test to statistically evaluate whether adolescents whose best friends are smokers try their first cigarettes at a younger age than those whose best friends are nonsmokers. This design, like the one underlying the example in the previous paragraph, also emerges from a useful and interesting (and more common) research question, one with policy relevance. But the model comparison in Equations 1 and 2 has certain advantages. Those were dynamic models that accounted explicitly for age or time. They referenced more features of the reality that is being described by the models (e.g., an adolescent network and interaction between adolescents) that are only implicit in the ANOVA. Finally, the parameters in Equations 1 and 2 are structurally meaningful. us evaluate and compare models include the chi-square, the root-mean-square error of approximation, and the Akaike information criterion (AIC), among others. As the two models defined above are evaluated, no chance-level null hypothesis is posited, nor is an alternative constructed, at least not in the sense that those concepts are usually treated. However, traditional statistical concepts are used in this comparison, such as a test statistic (e.g., chi-square values), a sampling distribution (the theoretical chi-square), and an alpha level (to tune the trade-off between fit and parsimony). Further, the NHST perspective is embedded within this statistical evaluation in the sense that there is a null hypothesis built into the model comparison (i.e., whether the population parameters that T1 and T2 estimate are equal to one another). This is the sense in which the modeling perspective subsumes NHST.
If the models are special cases of the GLM (e.g., regression, ANOVA, or ANCOVA models), then there is a traditional link to standard statistical analysis. In this case, the uniformly most powerful test statistic to compare the models is Fisher's F. Further, the standard representation, F = MS (between)/MS (within), can be algebraically rewritten as a model comparison between two linear models, one of which is nested within the other:
where E = error sum of squares, df = degrees of freedom, and the subscripts r and f refer to the reduced model and the full model, respectively. Cramer (1972) , Appelbaum and Cramer (1974) , and Maxwell and Delaney (2004, p. 77) developed and elaborated this formulation, and Yuan (2005) presented a modern discussion of the relation between test statistics and fit indices.
There is considerable conceptual value in studying the structure of Equation 3. In the numerator of the numerator, Er  Ef,, the fits of the full and reduced models are compared (note that this part of Equation 3 is often represented using R 2 instead of error-sum-of-squares terminology:
22 fr RR  ). The difference in fit is algebraically traded off against the difference in parsimony, measured as dfr  dff, by dividing the former by the latter. The simpler model estimates fewer parameters and therefore leaves more data points free to test the fit of the model to the data. Conceptually, therefore, the ratio in the numerator of Equation 3 compares the models by measuring the improvement in fit per degree of freedom. Finally, the ratio in the denominator defines the total fit versus parsimony trade-off available in the full model, so that the equation measures the amount of available fit versus parsimony trade-off that is actually achieved. 6 Further, this conceptual interpretation for trading off fit and parsimony also has a well-known and carefully studied sampling distribution-the theoretical F distribution developed by Fisher-under a set of also well-known and carefully studied assumptions.
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Historically, it is important that ANOVA and other linear models, even when cast into the NHST framework, have always had a model comparison interpretation underlying them.
Prerevolution, the F measures whether the difference between group means is greater than would be expected by chance. Postrevolution, the F measures whether the larger model fits the data better per degree of freedom than the smaller model, in broad linear model settings. It is notable that the mathematics is algebraically (computationally) identical in the two perspectives, but the epistemological import has shifted substantially. Fisher, whose development of ANOVA motivated the NHST paradigm, also provided the basis for modeling. In fact, he developed a framework for the modeling perspective even before NHST became the basic 20th-century epistemology, and he stated (Fisher, 1925, pp. 8-9 ) that modeling comprises three steps, specification, estimation, and goodness of fit.
In the next section, I address one of the causes of the past unhealthy preoccupation with NHST, which is the focusing on statistical analyses as a set of procedures. Postrevolution, statistical analysis supports the development and evaluation of models.
Behavior Fit to Designed Models, Models Designed to Fit Behavior
The word models is at the center of this section heading, with two different perspectives emanating from that central word. At least part of the problem in the diffusion of postrevolution thinking is that within the field of psychology, we practice research methods and teach statistics as though statistical modeling is just a set of procedures. After a semester of either undergraduate or graduate statistics, students are typically conversant with the prerevolution perspective, and many applied researchers also think of their statistical problems from the procedural perspective SEM has been built into a powerful analytic method and is a prototype of the first approach to postrevolutionary modeling. SEM is a quantitative method that exists independently of any particular application. The success SEM depends on the extent to which it is applied in many research settings. Such methods can be (and often are) treated as "procedures," though this perspective is limiting. Similarly, multilevel modeling, log-linear modeling, and ARIMA modeling can be, and often are, applied procedurally.
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Alternatively, some scholars build their own models to fit specific behavioral domains.
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) developed a mathematical model of short-term and long-term memory. Shepard (1982) presented a mathematical model of musical perception based on the same type of double-helix structure that underlies the DNA molecule. Becker (1991) presented mathematical models of intrahousehold allocations, which treat the family as an economic unit.
Rodgers and Doughty (2001) built probabilistic stopping-rule models of human reproduction in which childbearing decision making was conditioned on the previous sex composition of the family. Other examples abound. These models explicitly corresponded to the psychological, economic, or demographic behavior they were describing (see Rodgers, Rowe, & Buster, 1998, for further discussion). This second postrevolution approach builds the model to fit specific behavioral characteristics and requirements. Such models are not likely to be useful to anyone outside the particular behavioral domain. Their success is measured by how well they are observed by experts in a particular subject area to predict and explain tightly constrained behaviors. Roberts and Pashler (2000) defined a number of ways to evaluate the success of theoretical models in addition to good fits, including a model's flexibility, its ability to rule out plausible but theoretically indefensible alternatives, and its ability to predict unusual or surprising occurrences (also see Rodgers & Rowe, 2002, for commentary) .
The cigarette smoking models in the previous section illustrate this second approach. The smoking models discussed there are examples of a class of models called epidemic models of the onset of social activities (EMOSA models). They have been developed to describe the explicit social contagion process through which adolescents influence one another to engage in certain adolescent behavior, including smoking and drinking (Rodgers, 2003; Rowe & Rodgers, 1991) and sexual behavior (Rodgers & Rowe, 1993; Rowe, Rodgers, & Meseck-Bushey, 1989 ). These QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 23 models are operationalized as equations, each term of which explicitly matches a piece of the reality that the equations are designed to fit. Rodgers et al. (1998) contrasted an EMOSA model of adolescent sexual development with traditional linear models:
[These EMOSA models] are generated from processes that are more realistic than those for which linear models account. For example, no one believes that an adolescent deciding whether to engage in sexual intercourse for the first time explicitly evaluates their biological drive, weights it by a constant, adds that to a weighted measure of peer pressure, subtracts a weighted measure of religiosity, and makes a decision about sexual behavior (or anything else) on the basis of the computation. Yet we understand that adolescents may approximately act as though they are making this computation, and therefore the model is predictive (even if not descriptive). On the other hand, our . . . The parameters in these models are what Wright (1921 Wright ( , 1960 and Pearl (2000) referred to as "causal" or "structural" parameters, meaning that they should be interpreted as having substantive import. Roald Hoffman (2003) Clearly, Hoffman's imaginary model, focused on "how things work," is designed to match a physical reality.
Putting the Heart Before the Course
The quiet revolution has been relatively silent for several (overlapping) reasons. First, there is the inertia associated with NHST; it is difficult to change a zeitgeist, especially one with deep epistemological status. Second, the basic concepts associated with modeling are still spreading through the applied research community. Third, the modeling perspective is not treated in most statistics or methods classrooms. In this section, I discuss moving the modeling revolution into the classroom.
There are three epistemological approaches described in this article and potentially used in teaching statistics in the classroom. All three are critical and should be incorporated into the basic graduate curriculum in psychology departments. The first perspective is the prerevolution approach used in the majority of psychology classrooms, which is based on NHST. The second is the model development and model comparison approach, applied in relation to existing statistical methods such as SEM, multilevel modeling, and categorical data analysis. This pedagogy is realized when students take classes in which models compete against one another using statistics that account for the fit-parsimony trade-off. The third perspective occurs when QUIET METHODOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 25 students are taught how to develop their own mathematical models and to evaluate them statistically. The first approach-basic NHST-must continue to be taught at introductory levels (though accounting for its relationship to the second and third perspectives, which has seldom occurred in the past at the introductory level). Including both the second and third perspectives as core curriculum within graduate training programs will be necessary to further spread the modeling revolution to applied researchers.
Some textbook writers have already contributed to the implementation of this transition. Judd and McClelland (1989) and Delaney (1990, 2004 [2nd ed.] ) anticipated the modeling revolution. 8 Many of the basic concepts are relatively stable between pre-and postrevolutionary thinking, including computational procedures associated with the mean and variance, the median and mean absolute deviation, as well as ANOVA, regression, and the GLM.
At the level of the details, not much has changed (which is a partial explanation for why the modeling revolution has remained quiet). But the philosophical basis has changed, and thus we should add new elements to our pedagogy. The two textbooks mentioned above have contributed to that philosophical transition.
How has the philosophy changed? First, the null no longer has a very important role in this process. Even (especially) Fisher would support this change. In fact, he was never especially enamored with ANOVA or its broader NHST potential; rather, he called it only a "convenient method of arranging the arithmetic" (Fisher, 1934, p. 52) . The null hypothesis of no effect, of purely chance processes generating the patterns in the data (what some call the "nil" hypothesis)
is just one of many competitors with the larger model. Is this null model of any interest? Only if the researcher suggests that it is (see Wainer, 1999 , for examples of a few settings that motivate the value of the nil/null). Second, shifting from "testing the null" to "building a model" puts us right where most of our language is anyway, when we distinguish between exploratory and confirmatory approaches, between developing or evaluating a model. other measures of the complexity of a model, should be brought forward within the modern teaching agenda. Finally, our methodological pedagogy should be developed so that-at least in more advanced methods courses, after mastery of basic principles-students are taught how to apply statistical concepts to evaluate their own models, from both of the second and third epistemological perspectives developed earlier in this section.
Future textbook writers must necessarily help with this transition. Embedding statistical analysis models within successful and well-understood modeling methods (e.g., SEM, multilevel modeling) is advantageous (the second epistemological approach above). But there is no reason to rely only on existing analytic models, in either applied research or teaching. A different class of models-nonlinear models, chaotic models, differences models, and so forth-can be built so that the mathematical features of the models match the empirical reality being described. Explicit pedagogy should be given to measuring the simplicity, flexibility, and fit of a mathematical model (see, e.g., Myung, Forster, & Browne, 2000; Preacher, 2006) . Treatment of power should be expanded, because the probabilistic specification of power shifts between the NHST perspective and the modeling perspective (e.g., MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996 A logical teaching curriculum-implemented across several classes-would begin with treatment of exploratory and descriptive procedures such as the mean and variance, not just as descriptive statistics but as models of the data (including attention to the resulting residuals and graphical methods for portraying data). At this level, the idea of simple models competing with one another (e.g., the mean vs. the median) can be introduced. The next natural transition would involve treatment of traditional statistical models that must be mastered by research scientists, including ANOVA, regression, and other linear models. For at least the short term, these models can first be treated from the NHST sums-of-squares approach, though infusing that treatment with an introduction to modeling is critical. 9 Then, treating structural equation models, multilevel models, log-linear models, and nonlinear dynamic models should be the next step, and at this point the modeling perspective is necessary pedagogy (and will be more natural if the modeling perspective has been a part of the pedagogy from the beginning). Finally, explicit pedagogy should be developed to teach students how to build their own models of the particular reality in which they have interest. Currently, this type of teaching-when it occurs at all-usually occurs through mentorship within graduate (and postgraduate) training. Introduction to this third epistemological approach should be included within graduate-level textbooks, and dedicated texts should be developed as well. Box, 1978) . This view can reinforce postrevolution pedagogy. Finally, treatment of EDA and the mathematics of transforming variables, Tukey's (1977) ladder of reexpression, residual analysis, and linking exploratory and confirmatory approaches as based on the common goal of building models should more completely infuse both introductory and advanced statistics textbooks. The textbooks mentioned above are actively contributing to these types of transitions.
Modeling as Art, Art as Modeling
A final advantage of shifting our epistemology from a mechanistic NHST perspective to one that involves developing and evaluating scientific models has been (barely) below the surface of this whole discussion. We might call it the softening of our statistical and methodological practice, in the sense of both increased flexibility and increased reliance on creativity. The language of NHST is filled with rigidity and conflict: "rejection," "null,"
"power," "fail to reject." In prerevolutionary thinking about statistics, we cannot even "go fishing." Meehl (1990) discussed the concept of verisimilitude, which includes within it concepts related to the beauty, as well as the utility, of a model. Thissen (2001) , in his presidential address to the Psychometric Society, quoted Pablo Picasso: "Art is a lie that enables us to realize the truth" (p. 475). Abelson (1995, p. 14) suggested that "if a single explanatory principle explains several results, the story is . . . not only coherent, it is elegant" (italics in original). Hoffman (2003) suggested that "many theories are popular because they tell a rollicking good story, one that is sage in capturing how the world works" (p. 224).
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Engaging in science as a creative process requires thinking scientifically in creative ways.
The application of NHST as a mechanical set of procedures precludes creativity. Building and evaluating statistical and mathematical models encourages creativity. To support the broad epistemological shift within the field of psychology from the first to the second perspective is the primary goal of this article, a process well underway, but one that requires further specification, organization, and attention. 
